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The paper discusses fundamental problems in mathematical description of social
systems based on physical concepts, with so-called statistical social systems being the
main subject of consideration. Basic properties of human beings and human societies
that distinguish social and natural systems from each other are listed to make it clear
that individual mathematical formalism and physical notions should be developed to
describe such objects rather then can be directly inherited from classical mechanics
and statistical physics. As a particular example systems with motivation are considered.
Their characteristic features are analyzed individually and the appropriate mathematical
description is proposed. Finally the paper concludes that the basic elements necessary
for describing statistical social systems or, more rigorously, systems with motivation are
available or partly developed in modern physics and applied mathematics.
Keywords: social systems; statistical systems; motivation; decision-making; prediction;
bounded rationality, action points.
1. Introduction
During the last years it has become evident that a novel interdisciplinary branch
of science, physics of social systems or sociophysics, is currently under development
(for a review of the state of art in this field and its history see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6]). Various social processes and phenomena observed in large groups of people
integrated together by some activity have become the subject matter of this science.
Voting behavior in elections, opinion formation, culture and language evolution, co-
operative interaction among trade agents, dynamics of traffic and pedestrian flows,
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etc. are typical objects of such investigations.a In some sense, sociophysics can be
regarded as a novel branch of the “quantitative sociodynamics”. The latter deals
with the mathematical modeling of various phenomena out of different sectors of
the human society conventionally investigated in separate social sciences such as
demography, sociology, political science, and economics (for review and discussion
of basic mathematical ideas of the quantitative sociodynamics see, e.g., [9, 10, 11,
12]).
At the current state of art, the mathematical formalism of the quantitative so-
ciodynamics and, correspondingly, sociophysics is based on the notions and meth-
ods developed in statistical physics of many-particle systems and synergetics (e.g.,
[13]). The systems under consideration in this scope consist of different organiza-
tional strata and involve, in particular, a microlevel and a macrolevel as well as a
“bottom up” and “top down” interaction between them. The microlevel comprises
individuals with their inclinations, decisions, and actions; the macrolevel contains
collective political and economic structures, social trends, etc. [11, 12].
In the modern approach the mathematical description of social systems at the
macrolevel is reduced, first, to finding a set of appropriate order parameters, i.e.,
collective material and personal variables, whose time variations specify the system
dynamics completely [11, 12]. This point is rather similar to one in describing com-
plex systems of inanimate nature. Then, the construction of the equations governing
these order parameters can be implemented, roughly speaking, in two ways.
Within a phenomenological approach the corresponding mathematical models
are developed based purely on available macroscopic empirical data. In this case
the question of family of models will best describe given social systems is solely a
matter of empirical work.
The other possibility is to derive the required governing equations based on the
elementary dynamics of the system elements determined at the microlevel. In this
feature social and inanimate systems are quite distinct from each other. Strictly
speaking, there are no mathematical constructions governing individual social be-
havior of human beings [11]. Besides, in contrast to physical particles the behavior
of human beings is the complex outcome of many physiological and psychological
processes in addition to social aspects under consideration. So any modeling of social
behavior of human beings inevitably involves a huge and unwarranted simplification
of the real situation [1]. Nevertheless these problems can be overcome for some sys-
tems comprising many individuals (elements) similar in behavior within a certain
social sector under consideration. In systems listed above in relation to sociophysics
the principle of local self-averaging holds. It implies that analyzed phenomena are
mainly controlled by cooperative interaction of individuals, i.e. based on cumula-
tive contribution of many elements. As a result, the individual properties of similar
aIt should be noted that collective behavior of animal groups, such as schools of fish, flocks of
birds or swarms of insects (for a review see, e.g. [7, 8]) is actually a relative problem to the subject
under consideration.
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elements are averaged in some manner during their interaction. The latter feature
enables us, first, to introduce the notion of characteristic element (social agent)
with properties being the same for all such individuals. Second, in this way the
individuality of human beings can be taken into account in terms of random factors
characterized by statistical properties being again the same for all the characteris-
tic elements of one type. In addition, the effect of “social influence” [14] stimulates
individuals to behave alike. Exactly the principle of local self-averaging is grounds
for applying the techniques of statistical physics to describing these social systems
which will be referred below as to statistical social systems. In this way dealing with
a specific class of phenomena the microlevel of statistical social systems is mimicked
by a statistical ensemble of the relevant characteristic elements. Moreover, we note
that the feasibility of introducing the macroscopic order parameters seems to be a
direct consequence of the local self-averaging.
To avoid confusion it should be pointed out that here the principle of local self-
averaging is used only to introduce the notion of characteristic element and does not
necessary cause the mean field description to hold. For instance, the introduction
of aggregate variables in macroeconomics can fail when fluctuations in the behavior
of economic agents become crucial (for review of this problem see, e.g. [15, 16,
17]). Nevertheless even in this case the principle of local self-averaging holds if such
fluctuations comprise many individuals behaving alike.
In the present paper we focus out attention on the second way of construct-
ing the governing equations for macroscopic order parameters. Namely, we discuss
the fundamental features of constructing characteristic elements mimicking the mi-
crolevel of statistical social systems, which actually is one of the main subjects of
sociophysics. The relevant mathematical models have to take into account basic
peculiarities of human beings, in particular, the effects of purposefull or even ir-
rational decision making, motivations and trends in human behavior as well as a
contingent “free will” rooted in human nature [12]. By way of example so-called
systems with motivation will be considered in detail. It should be noted that the
majority of mathematical models proposed for statistical social systems use the no-
tions and concepts inherited directly from physics (see, e.g., reviews [1, 6]). These
models, however, are applicable to social systems as a rough approximation only,
at least, on the “microscopic” (most detailed) level because of takeing into account
just a few of the basic peculiarities of human beings.
In addition we would like to point out that in spite of the progress achieved
in sociophysics the long-standing question of whether mathematical formalism and
physical notions are applicable, at least in principle, to describing social systems is
actual up to now. There are widely different opinions on this question, including the
well known points of the classics of sociology. Emile Durkheim claimed that from
the general point of vies social and natural disciplines are rather similar in methods
and approaches [18], whereas Max Weber considered them to be fundamentally
distinctive [19]. The latter point is highly relevant to constructing the ensembles of
characteristic elements for the microlevel of social systems. So discussing the main
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subject of the present paper we make an attempt to restate the given question and
in this way to overcome this contradiction. Assuming the statistical social systems
to admit of a description in terms of physical and mathematical notions we pose
a question as to what mathematical formalism is appropriate and able to take
into account the basic peculiarities of social systems distinguishing them from the
inanimate objects.
Leaping ahead, it should be noted once more that the goal of this partly debat-
able paper is not to construct a specific model for a certain particular phenomenon
or system. By this paper we would like to attract the attention of the physical
society to the question what novel physical notions and mathematical formalism
should be developed or used in constructing relevant models for statistical social
systems at the microlevel. Human beings are so different from objects of inanimate
nature in their properties that the necessity of such investigation seems to be actu-
ally “self-evident”. To elucidate this point of view let us first list some of the basic
peculiarities of social objects distinguishing them clearly from systems of inanimate
nature.
2. Peculiarities of social systems
Below we will list basic characteristics distinguishing social and physical systems
from each other that are essential for the further mathematical constructions.
• (Individuality and complexity) Social systems are made up of elements (in-
dividuals, agents, decision makers, etc.) with pronounced individuality in
behavior and cognition. Besides, as noted in the Introduction, from the
standpoint of the modeling, human beings are maltifactorial objects; the
detailed behavior of each of them is a complex outcome of not only social
processes but a large number of physiological and psychological ones [1].
So many factors really influencing social phenomena remain uncontrollable
and lying beyond the analysis of social systems. By contrast, elements of
physical systems are assumed to admit of a complete description at least on
the “microscopic” level and elements of one type are identical in properties.
• (Uncertainty) The individuality and complexity of human beings endow
social systems with original variability and partial uncertainty. As a result
both the regular and random factors are present in their dynamics on any
level of detail [11, 12]. The classical dynamics of natural objects is deter-
ministic on the “microscopic” level and the probabilistic formalism used in
the statistical physics is caused by their reduced description.b
• (Memory and time constraints) Human society changes in time. So, first,
in studying the regularities of social systems reproducing the initial condi-
tions could be hampered or even impossible. Second, a priory, it is not clear
bThe quantum uncertainty reflecting the wave-particle dualism is unrelated to the subject under
discussion.
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how long the memory of social objects is. In other words, how long time
span should separate events in the past from the present instant in order
to ignore their effects within the most detailed description. For example,
stock markets, where human factor definitely matters, exhibit a long-time
memory behavior, namely, time correlations in the volatility of returns are
characterized by a power decay (see, e.g, [20, 21]). Natural systems, by con-
trast, are characterized by the reproducibility; under the same initial and
external conditions either their dynamics or probabilistic characteristics are
identical on all the trails. In this meaning, the history of natural systems
does not matter.
• (Motivation and value factors) The human behavior is governed by many
motives for achieving individual goals as well as obeys the social and cul-
tural norms. There is, typically, a set of possible strategies of behavior
among which a decision maker chooses the appropriate one. In doing so he
applies to various value factors that reflect his individual preferences and
the social and cultural meaning as well (for a review of these aspects see,
e.g., [23]). Such notions are just inapplicable to natural systems.
• (Information deficiency and breakdown of the explicit means-end relation-
ships) The decision-making environment involves many factors, external
and internal ones, that, on one hand, are hidden, i.e. are not recognizable
and controllable in principle for decision makers. On the other hand, these
factors affect substantially the dynamics of social systems. Therefore, first,
decision makers seldom have perfect information about the choice alterna-
tives and their consequences. Second, if a cause and its effect are separated
by a significant time interval it could be difficult to recognize and estab-
lish their relationship even within a very thorough analysis [23]. For the
disciplines studying natural objects the existence of the direct means-end
relationships is one of their cornerstones.
• (Learning, prediction, and social norms) To choose an appropriate behavior
under the information deficiency of social system states human beings draw
on either their own experience or the experience of the society. The former
one is gained during the learning process based on predicting the results of
their actions. The latter one is aggregated in various social norms of human
behavior. In particular, due to effects of the human prediction the dynamics
of a social system is affected substantially not only by its history and the
current state, but also by its possible future development existing in the
human mind (for discussion of these aspects within the so-called intentional
rationality see [22]). Such notions are also inapplicable to natural systems.
The aforementioned features enable us to claim that the description of statistical
social systems requires individual physical notions and mathematical formalism to
be developed. Such quantities like forces, free energy, entropy, temperature, etc.
could be inapplicable to social systems or their use requires special consideration
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even at the phenomenological level. In what follows we will discus these points in
detail with respect to a certain specific class of such objects, namely, statistical
ensembles of elements whose dynamics is governed by motives for their actions, the
evaluation of possible behavior strategies and making the appropriate choice with
its further correction. We will call such ensembles systems with motivation. Traffic
and pedestrian flows, interacting market agents, as well as in some sense bird flocks
and fish schools can be regarded as characteristic examples of the systems under
consideration.
However before passing directly to the main subject of the paper let us consider
from the general point of view the decision-making process. It plays the essential
role in a large variety of social systems and its properties should be taken into
account in the mathematical description of any statistical social system [11, 12].
3. Decision-making process
The classical theory of making decisions is based on the notion of the preference re-
lation and the utility function quantifying this relation (see, e.g., [24]). The concept
of the perfect rationality assumes the human choice or decision to be determined
by the most preferable result meeting the maximum of the utility function. The
related theory of making decisions under uncertainty also deals with some utility
function aggregating in itself the realization of various environmental conditions in
a probabilistic way. However, such an approach encounters obstacles caused by the
fundamental properties of human beings described above. For example, the possi-
bility of introducing the preference relation with respect to the final goals seems to
be doubtful whereas local aims that are similar in value can be indistinguishable
for human beings in making decisions.
In order to overcome these obstacles the concepts of bounded rationality [25, 26]
and limited cognition [27] have been developed (see also [28, 29, 23]). In particular,
it has been proposed [23] that the decision-making process (at least in statistical
social systems) should be mainly based on selection of possible behavior strategies
rather than final goals. Such a strategy is a certain sequence of local actions, i.e. a
collection of steps of achieving subsequent intermediate aims. These strategies are
formed in the trial-and-error process and evolve during the adaptation of individuals
to the decision-making environment under uncertainty of the information about the
social system states. Following [23] we will call these strategies heuristics.
These heuristics aggregate and accumulate the information about the previous
actions, successful and failed ones. That is way the history of a social system impacts
on its dynamics. There are at least two distinct ways of the heuristics formation.
The first one is the individual learning, i.e. the process of gaining the knowledge
about the successful rules of behavior via the personal experience or the experience
of individuals directly related to a given one. In particular, the idea that the indi-
vidual learning plays the leading role in the heuristics formation has been developed
in [30, 31] (see also references therein). The second way deals with the cooperative
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interaction of many individuals forming large units of human society. It is imple-
mented via the formation of the social norms and cultural values aggregating all
the fragments of information about the human society for a rather long time in-
terval. The human societies possess own mechanisms governing the social norms
and keeping up the social order (see, e.g., [23] and references therein). There are at
least two types of models for mechanisms via which the social norms and cultural
values arise and evolve. One of them is based on emulating the behavior of the
most successful persons, i.e. the social interdependence via significant others [32].
The other type models, interdependence via reference groups [33], go beyond the
individualistic level of social interdependence. They relate the social and cultural
proclivities of human behavior to some large groups or their typical representatives
that have high social rank.
4. Systems with motivation
In what follows we will confine our consideration to systems with motivation. Keep-
ing in mind traffic flow, ensembles of pedestrians, etc. as specific examples we will
develop the main physical notions and concepts of mathematical formalism that
allow for the basic features of human behavior discussed above. In this way we will
demonstrate, in particular, the feasibility of overcoming the discrepancy between
the disciplines studying natural and social systems.
It should be underlined beforehand, that we do not intend to construct a self-
consistent and complete theory of systems with motivation; it goes far beyond the
scope the present analysis. Our goal is to consider their main features individually
and to formulate the conceptual basis for constructing mathematical models for
specific phenomena.
4.1. Extended phase space
At the initial step we have to introduce the notion of the “phase space”, i.e., a
collection of variables {w} that completely characterize the state of a given social
system at the current moment of time t. Because of the properties listed above the
phase space of social systems can differ essentially from that of physical objects.
First, due to the human memory these variables taken at the current moment of
time are not necessary to specify the system dynamics. Only having been known at
all the previous moments of time, these variables determine the system dynamics
completely, may be in a certain probabilistic way. In other words, the rates {δtw} of
time variations in the phase variables should be certain functionals on themselves
rather then some functions,
{w[t′]}t′<t
 // {δtw} . (1)
Here the square brackets at the symbol w stand for the function w of the argument
t′ rather than its value taken at t′ and the symbol δtw denotes the time derivative w˙
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of the corresponding variable if it is continuous one or, otherwise, specifies step-like
jumps between its possible values.
Second, as noted above, the dynamics of a social system is governed by two
factors, the direct interaction of its elements, where each of them responds to the
behavior of the other elements in some way, and individual motives, wishes, trends,
etc, that are not explicitly visible to the others. So the phase space {w} of a system
with motivation is to comprise variables of two types, objective and subjective ones,
{w} = {q, h}, allowing us to call {w} the extended phase space. Let us discuss these
types of phase variables separately.
Objective phase space of an element α, by definition, is a collection of variables
{q}α, discrete or continuous ones, that completely characterize the possible states
of the given element α from the standpoint of the other elements. The information
about the state of the element α is necessary for them to make the appropriate
decisions in governing their own states. We have used the term “objective” in order
to underline that the characteristics {q}α of the element α are detectable for the
other elements. They are not related to the intentions, plans, wishes of the element
α which are hidden for external observers. It should be noted that the variables
{q}α are accessible for external observers only in principle. As noted above in a
social system getting information about the states of its elements can be hampered.
The combination of the objective phase variables of all the elements, {q}, makes up
the objective phase space of the given system. For example, the spatial coordinates
of pedestrians, the direction of motion, and may be their velocities form the objec-
tive phase space of the pedestrian ensemble, the coordinates and the velocities of
vehicles on a highway make up the objective phase space of traffic flow. The set of
personal opinions makes the objective phase space of voting process, cultural fea-
tures with preferences ascribed to every individual can be regarded as the objective
phase space of the cultural dynamics. The production and comprehensive matrices
characterizing the frequency of using and associating words to the corresponding
objects by individuals can be considered in the same way in describing the evolution
of languages (see [1] and references therein).
On one hand, the objective phase variables specify the state of a given system
from the standpoint of external observer. On the other hand the decision-making,
individual motives, wishes, goals, plans etc. rooted in the human mind plays the
key role in the dynamics of social systems [11, 12]. So there should be some way
for such internal processes to affect the system dynamics. Its implementation for
the systems under consideration is related to the notion of controllable variables
forming a special group of the objective phase variables. Elements of social systems
try to control their own states via maintaining or changing the objective phase
variables or a certain group of them enabling this action directly. The feasibility of
this action actually classifies a phase variable as controllable one. The subscript c
will be added to the corresponding variables {qc} to underline the given feature.
Time variations of the remaining quantities are determined by these controllable
variables and, may be, some natural regularities. For example, in traffic flow a driver
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can change directly only the velocity of his car. Therefore the velocities of cars are
the controllable variables, whereas the coordinates of their position on highways are
not so.
Keeping in mind traffic flow and a set of voters as examples of systems with
motivation, it is naturally to assume that if the objective phase space contains
together with a variable w also its time derivative w˙, then the latter is a controllable
phase variable whereas the variable w itself is not it. Otherwise, when only the
variable w enters the phase space it should be a controllable variable.
Subjective phase space: The other part of the phase space, the subjective phase
variables, is related to the internal processes in the decision-making. By definition,
the subjective variable {h} describe time variations in the controllable phase vari-
ables, namely, {h := δtqc}. The collection of quantities {h}α ascribed to a given
element α will be referred to as the subjective (hidden) phase variables of the el-
ement α and the combination of all these quantities will be called the subjective
phase space of the given system.
The quantities {h}α characterize active behavior of the element α in governing
its state and are related to its motives, wishes, goals, etc. in making decisions.
So they are accessible only for the element α and hidden for the others. For every
element α its subjective phase variables {h}α are valuable in their own right. This is
due to the fact that internal processes accompanying the decision-making themselves
take effort in order, for example, to get a decision of changing the current state of
the element α [23]. In addition, time variations in the quantities {qc} can affect this
element in some physical way. For example, the acceleration (or deceleration) of a
car can itself affect the stability of car motion and is felt explicitly by the drivers.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the structure of the extended phase space for systems with motivation.
Concluding the present subsection we note once more that the dynamics of
systems with motivation is determined directly by the objective and subjective
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variables simultaneously. That is why the phase space of systems with motivation
is made up of both the types of the phase variables, {w} = {q, h}. For example,
the accelerations of cars moving on a highway have to be treated as the subjective
phase variables of traffic flow and the functions quantifying the quality of individual
car motion should contain the car acceleration in the list of their arguments [34, 35,
36]. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the corresponding phase space.
The introduced phase variables form the required language for describing the
dynamics of systems with motivation.
4.2. Decision-making and heuristics choice
The decision making process governs time variations of the controllable objective
variables, which in turn via physical regularities determines the system dynamics
as a whole. Symbolically we write this in terms of time increment in the phase
variables
decision-making

{w} = {q, h}

{h = δtqc} +3
⊕

natural regularitiesks
{δtw}
(2)
As noted in Sec. 3, the decision-making is reduced to the choice of local heuristics
because of the bounded capacity of human cognition and the variety of factors
uncontrollable and hidden for elements of a social system. These heuristics, i.e., the
local strategies of the element behavior are sequences of actions focused on achieving
local aims. Since in statistical social systems the explicit means-end relationships
can be broken the specific actions of elements are evaluated by local motives rather
than intentions of getting final goals. The latter goals can only single out some
rather general class of the element actions. Moreover the final goals are typically
stated in a general form without particular details.
As the systems with motivation are concerned, the heuristics can be regarded as
possible trajectories of the forthcoming system dynamics which exist in the human
mind and are the unit elements in the decision-making. Therefore at the first step
in specifying the heuristics choice we introduce an imaginary phase space {̟}α
in addition to the real one {w} which is ascribed individually to each element α.
So, in fact, we have introduced the set of spaces existing in the human mind. It
is the imaginary phase spaces that enable us to describe a hypothetical dynamics
of the system in the near feature expected by its elements based on the available
information. Every imaginary phase space
{̟}α = {θ, η}α (3)
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comprises the objective variables {θ}α of all the elements and the subjective vari-
ables {η}α of the given element α. These quantities specify the hypothetical states
of the elements in the “mind” of the element α. Therefore the symbol θα′:α is writ-
ten in bold to underline its dependence on two indices, meaning the phase variables
of the element α′ in the “mind” of the element α. Collection (3) does not contain
the subjective phase variables of the other elements because they are hidden for the
given element α.
In these terms a possible strategy of behavior of the element α is represented as
a certain time dependence {η[t′′]}t
′′>t
α of its subjective phase variables in the near
future. The hypothetical time dependence {θ[t′′]}t
′′>t
α:α of its objective variables is
determined by the given strategy of behavior. The hypothetical time dependence
{θ[t′′]}t
′′>t
α′:α of the objective variables ascribed to another element α
′ 6= α is con-
structed in the “mind” of the element α based on the available information. We also
will use the notation {̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
α to denote this strategy as the hypothetical motion
of the system in the space {̟}α. The symbol {̟[t
′′]}t
′′>t without the element index
stands for the heuristics as whole.
The elements are assumed to evaluate and choose the desired strategies of be-
havior {̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t in some way which determines the system dynamics. In this
choice human beings can follow some rational reasons, including social and cultural
norms, or even irrational motives, the latter, however, will not be considered in
the present paper. It should be noted that in this choice every element α evaluates
possible strategies of its own behavior {̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α only, the behavior of the other
elements is regarded by it as given beforehand or predictable with some probability.
These features of the heuristics choice enable us to represent symbolic expression (1)
as
{w[t′], ̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
t′<t
individual choice
of system elements
+3
''N
NN
NN
NN
NN
NN
{̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t
{h[t′′]}t
′′
>t
t| qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
qq
{δtw}
(4)
It should be pointed out that in choosing the heuristics the elements can predict the
system dynamics extrapolating the time variations of the phase variables in some
simple way, for example, fixing them or supposing the linear time dependence to
hold in the near future. Figure 2 illustrates this.
Concluding the present subsection we state that the laws governing systems with
motivation should be based on some variational principles dealing with trajectories
{η[t′′]}t
′′>t in the imaginary subjective spaces of the corresponding elements. As
a result the governing equations have to belong to a certain class of temporally
boundary value problems because these trajectories join the current state of the
system with “desirable” ones (cf. [35]). Some implementation of these variational
principles gives us the time variations {δtw} of the phase variables at the current
time t. In this sense the “imaginary future” of the system affects its dynamics at
present.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the decision-making process governing the system dynamics.
4.3. The approximation of perfect rationality
The implementation of the variational principles mentioned in the previous sub-
section requires some measure for quantifying the heuristics with respect to their
value at least approximately. This measure can be constructed in a certain limit
case called the perfect rationality. It comes into being when, first, analyzed situa-
tions are repeated many times, with the environment conditions being the same.
Thereby the time restrictions affecting the decision-making process are removed
and the complete information about the system becomes accessible. Second, the
elements are able to correct their states continuously.
Under such conditions the individual choice of the optimal heuristics
{ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α by a given element α is reduced to finding the maximum of a cer-
tain preference functional
Uα := Uα
{
{̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
α
}
(5a)
with respect to its own strategy of behavior {η[t′′]}t
′′>t
α . In the limit of perfect
rationality functional (5a) depends only on the trial trajectory of the system motion
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in the imaginary space {̟[t′′]}t
′′>t. Besides, all the objective parts of the individual
imaginary spaces are identical. The following expression
Uα :=
+∞∫
t
dt′′e−
(t′′−t)
T uα(̟α[t
′′]) (5b)
is an example of functional (5a), where all the moments of time contribute indepen-
dently of each other with the weight exp{−(t′′ − t)/T }) decreasing exponentially
as the time interval t′′ − t increases, the scale T specifies the temporal horizon of
predicting the system dynamics, and the function uα(̟α[t
′′]) measures the contri-
bution of individual time moments.
Functional (5) quantifies the preferences of the element α in the choice of its own
heuristics, provided the behavior of the other elements is known. In other words,
within the frameworks of the perfect rationality the optimal strategy of behavior
{ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α is determined by the expression
{ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α ⇐= max
{η[t′′]}t
′′>t
α
Uα . (6)
Expressions (6) specifies the optimal heuristics {ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t as certain trajectories.
Therefore, in particular, if the elements choose these optimal strategies of behavior
at the current moment of time and follow them, then further correction of the system
motion will be not necessary. The latter is the essence of the Nash equilibrium.
By way of example, we note that for traffic flow schema (4) meeting condition (6)
in the limit of perfect rationality gives rise to Newtonian type models [35]. It is the
case where the concept of social forces [6] holds. If the driver behavior is not perfect
then the description of traffic dynamics goes beyond the notions of Newtonian
mechanics [36].
The limit of perfect rationality has been included in the present paper to il-
lustrate an way of constructing a measure of the heuristics to be used further.
Nevertheless, even in this limit equation (6) does not lead directly to the initial
value problem, i.e. the class of of mathematical models involving Newtonian me-
chanics. Indeed, let us assume, for example, that a given system is characterized by
continuous objective variables {q}, all of them being controllable, so hα = dqα/dt.
Then the maximization procedure (6) gives us the governing equation in the form
∂uα
∂qα
+
1
T
∂uα
∂hα
−
d
dt′′
∂uα
∂hα
= 0 . (7)
In this case the found governing equation (7) is of the second order with respect
to the objective phase variables, whereas the initial conditions specifying the ini-
tial system state can contain only the objective variables and, thereby, does not
determine uniquely the system dynamics. By this rather simple example we have
demonstrated the fact that some terminal conditions should be imposed on the
system to determine its dynamics. Therefore we again get the conclusion that the
dynamics of the analyzed systems belong to a certain class of temporal boundary
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value problems. Another fact demonstrated by this example is the influence of the
prediction horizon T on the system dynamics. If the parameter T is rather small
then the governing equation (7) is practically of the first order with respect to the
objective variables {q} and in this limit the system dynamics can be considered to
be some initial value problem. In the opposite limit, i.e. when the parameter T is
large the effect of the terminal conditions is crucial.
Rational dynamics attractor: In order to discuss further a new type of nonequi-
librium phase transitions caused by the bounded capacity of the human cognition
let us single out a special subclass of systems with motivation. For these systems
the governing equation (6) admits the steady state solution corresponding to the
union of the origin {η = 0} of the subjective phase space and a certain point Q
(or a set of points with equal values of the controllable variables, {qc = const})
of the objective phase space. If the system is initially located at this point and
its elements do nothing with respect to controlling its dynamics, i.e., keep up the
current values of the controllable variables, then it will not leave this point further.
For example, traffic flow where all the cars move with the same speed and at some
optimal headway distance matches this situation. If the system during its motion
governed by expression (6) tends to the point Q or the corresponding set of points,
it will be referred to as an attractor of rational dynamics.
4.4. Bounded rationality and action points
In this section we returns to the main subject and discuss the basic notions of
the elementary dynamics that a necessary for describing systems with motivation.
As noted previously, the time constraints together with the bounded capacity of
human cognition endow the choice of heuristics and, thereby, the system dynamics
with random properties. If two strategies of behavior are rather close to each other
in value then it can be tough to order them by preference and to choose one in a
rational way. To tackle this problem we appeal to the notion of perception threshold
Θ. The perception threshold as well as the preference functional depends generally
on the type of elements, which here is not labeled directly to simplify the notations.
Bounded rationality: Let us make use of the preference functional (5a). Two
strategies of behavior {η1[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α and {η2[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α are considered to be equivalent,
if the corresponding magnitudes of the preference functional meet the inequality
|U1,α − U2,α| . Θ, provided the other environment conditions are the same. It is
the point where the form of the preference functional (5a) becomes determined. The
matter is that the action of any increasing function on the preference functional gives
rise to a new preference functional describing the same set of the optimal heuristics.
Introducing the perception threshold we actually fix its form.
When a currently chosen strategy of behavior {η[t′′]}t
′′>t
α is close to the optimal
one in the given sense, the element α has no motives to change it. Roughly speaking,
if it is not clear what to do, to change nothing is quite adequate. If the difference
in the magnitudes of the preference functional (5a) for the two strategies becomes
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remarkable in comparison with the perception threshold, the element α recognizes
the necessity of correcting its current state. Exactly this choice of new more proper
heuristics is the point where the random factors enter the system directly. Indeed,
since all the strategies of behavior that are close to the optimal heuristics in terms
of the perception threshold are regarded as equivalent then the choice of some of
them is a random event. The time moment when this choice arises is also a random
quantity.
It should be pointed out that the perception threshold Θ characterizes prob-
abilistic properties of the element behavior rather than the step-like dynamics.
Namely, let us consider two heuristics, the strategy of behavior {ηc[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α that
is taken by the element α at the current moment of time t and the optimal one
{ηop[t
′′]}t
′′>t
α which is actually hidden for it. When the difference in the corre-
sponding magnitudes of the preference functional (5a) becomes equal to the thresh-
old, |Uc,α − Uop,α| = Θ, the events of correcting the current state by the ele-
ment α just arise most offen rather than exhibits a stepwise behavior. In the
cases |Uc,α − Uop,α| ≪ Θ the element cannot recognize the fact of the system
deviating from the optimal dynamics. States matching the opposite inequality
|Uc,α − Uop,α| ≫ Θ cannot be reached because the element would respond earlier.
In particular, according to empirical data for traffic flow such events of correcting
the car motion are distributed rather widely near the corresponding threshold [37].
Action points: Let us introduce the notion of action points in order to describe
the dynamics of systems with motivation. An action point is an event of chang-
ing the current strategy of behavior by some element in correcting its state. Every
action point is associated with this strategy and the time moment of changing it.
When the dynamics of a given system is optimal within the human perception char-
acterized by the threshold Θ its elements do not correct their heuristics. At these
moments of time the system motion is not controlled by the elements and proceeds
according to natural regularities affecting the system and the strategy chosen pre-
viously. When the system motion deviates from the optimal one substantially the
elements recognize this fact and correct their individual strategies of behavior. In
doing so an element selects some new strategy of behavior in a neighborhood of
the optimal heuristics whose thickness quantified by the preference functional (5a)
is less than or of the order of the perception threshold. Then the given element
follows the selected heuristics until it recognize the necessity of correcting its state
again. We note that the notion of action points for the car-following process was
introduced for the first time in [38] to denote the moments of time when drivers
correct the motion of their vehicles by pressing the gas or braking pedals.
In these terms the dynamics of a system with motivation can be represented
as a sequence of action points, i.e. jumps between various strategies of the element
behavior. The particular strategies of behavior joined by these jump-like transitions
and their time moments are random quantities. These random transitions are the
cause of the stochasticity in the dynamics of systems with motivation. Between the
action points the system dynamics is not controlled by its elements at all and is
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regular or affected by random factors of natural origin. Symbolically this feature is
represented by the following diagram generalizing the previous one (4)
{w[t′], ̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
t′<t
individual choice
of system elements
+3

{̟op[t′′]}t
′′>t
action points
t| rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
rr
{δtw} {δth}ks
(8)
The concept of action points is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Illustration of the system dynamics governed by elements with bounded rationality.
Dynamical traps: If a given system possesses an attractor of rational dynamics it
can exhibit a new type of cooperative phenomena. Indeed, by definition, the point
Q in the objective phase space matches the steady-state dynamics in the limit
of perfect rationality. Then the elements with bounded rationality will regard the
system motion in the vicinity of this attractor also optimal. To discuss the given
feature in more detail let us introduce the notion of dynamical traps.
Using the preference functional (5a) we construct a certain neighborhood of
the set Q
⊗
{h = 0} in the space of heuristics {̟[t′′]}t
′′>t of thickness Θ and then
project it onto the objective phase space {w}. In this way we obtain a certain neigh-
borhood DQ of the set Q called the dynamical trap region. When the system with
bounded rationality enters this region its elements consider the system dynamics
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optimal and the correction of their state unnecessary. Since the system dynamics
in the region DQ is really close to the optimal one, a time span between two action
points could rather prolonged in comparison with that of the system dynamics far
from DQ. In other words such fragments of system motion inside the dynamical
trap region can be regarded as long-lived states [40, 39]. Their origin is due to the
stagnation of the element active behavior during a relatively long time. Therefore
dynamical traps are able to induce nonequilibrium phase transitions of a new type
that should be widely met in social systems [40, 39, 41] rather than in natural ones.
We note that the dynamical traps for Hamiltonian systems was introduced in [42,
43] (see also a review [44]) and for systems with nonlinear oscillations it was done in
[45]. A simple example of nonequilibrium phase transitions induced by dynamical
traps is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Illustration of nonequilibrium phase transitions induced by dynamical traps. The figure
presents one-dimensional oscillator with dynamical traps affected by white noise ǫξ(t) of a small
amplitude ǫ≪ 1 and energy dissipation characterized by the friction coefficient σ. The dynamical
trap region is a certain neighborhood of the x-axis. The effect of dynamical traps is described by
the factor Ω[v] depending on the velocity v; inside the traps region Ω[v]≪ 1, outside it Ω[v] ≈ 1.
Therefore outside the region of dynamical traps the system motion is rather regular, whereas inside
it the oscillator dynamics is stagnated and affected mainly by weak noise only. As demonstrated
numerically [39], the system undergoes phase transition; the form of the distribution function in
the space {x, v} is converted from unimodal to bimodal one as the intensity of dynamical traps
grows. The resulting bimodal distribution is shown in the right fragment of this figure.
4.5. Memory effects: individual learning and formation of social
and cultural norms
In the previous subsections we have considered the description elements of the
decision-making related to predicting the forthcoming events. Here the effects of
the system history is under consideration.
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Knowledge accumulation: Because of the bounded capacity of human cognition,
gaining the knowledge about the proper strategies of behavior is crucial. As noted in
Sec. 3 there are two channels of accumulating and aggregating such information. One
is the individual learning of the elements based on own experience or local interac-
tion with the other elements. In some sense it is a typical mechanism of cooperative
phenomena widely met in natural systems and caused by local or quasi-local inter-
action of their particles. It seems to be possible to describe the individual learning
process using the introduced phase space and perception thresholds. No additional
variables are necessary to do this. Indeed, let us ascribe an individual perception
threshold Θα to every element α. Then the individual learning is represented as
the evolution of the perception thresholds {Θα} caused by some interaction of the
elements. Symbolically it takes the form
{w[t′]}t′<t =⇒ {Θα(t)} . (9)
In these terms the individual learning is reduced to the time decrease of the per-
ception thresholds {Θα} due to the accumulation and aggregation of information
about the system properties.
The second channel is related to a unique collective interaction of all the elements
in a social system in addition to their individual interrelations of various types. It
arises via the formation of social and cultural norms of behavior. These norms affect
directly the heuristics and their preference, and involve all the members of a social
system or their large groups independently of their relationships and distance in
space and time. The social and cultural norms aggregate the information about the
properties and features of a social system during a long time interval and make up
the basis for finding general rules of successful strategies of behavior. So in order
to describe the effect of the social and cultural norms on the system dynamics
some additional variables, the space of cultural features {χ}, should be introduced.
We presume that the cultural features cannot be ascribed to individual persons in
any way, they have their own carriers, e.g., books, newspapers, magazines, movies,
broadcasts, and other types of mass media. Symbolically the formation of social
and cultural norms can be written as
{w[t′]}t′<t =⇒ {χ(t)} , (10)
where, as it is rather natural to assume, the father a given event in the past, the
weaker its influence on the present. In order to include the effect of these norms on
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the social system dynamics we generalize diagram (8) as follows
{w[t′]}t′<t +3
individual learning (((h
(h(h
(h(h
(h(h
(h(h
norm space {χ(t)}

O
O
O
{w[t′], ̟[t′′]}t
′′>t
t′<t
individual choice
of system elements
+3

{̟op[t
′′]}t
′′>t
action points
rz mmm
mmm
mmm
mmm
mm
mmm
mmm
mmm
mmm
mm
{δtw} {δth}ks
(11)
which is the final diagram presenting the essence of the mathematical components
and notions describing the systems with motivation.
Problem of initial conditions: As noted in Sec. 2 the memory effects and time
constraints pose a question as to whether the notion of initial conditions are ap-
plicable at all to the statistical social systems. In the remaining part of the paper
we will discuss this problem considering as a particular example the car following
dynamics.
Let us confine ourselves to describing the dynamics of a car following a lead car
moving, e.g., at a fixed speed V in the spirit of the social force model. The social
force model [6] relates the acceleration a of the following car to its current velocity
v and the distance between the two cars (headway distance) h,
a = F(h, v) . (12)
Hear F(h, v) is a certain function which takes into account two stimuli in car driving,
the necessity of maintaining safe headway and zero value relative velocity. It should
be underlined that model (12) deals with the acceleration a and velocity v of the
following car as well as the headway distance h taken at the current moment of time
t. However, because of the bounded capacity of human cognition drivers cannot
recognize the necessity to correct the car motion immediately. The information
about the state of motion should be aggregated and accumulated during some time
for a driver to make the proper conclusion about correcting its motion. Keeping in
mind expressions similar to (9) and (10) let us represent the relationship between
the acceleration a and the social force F(h, v) in the following functional form
a(t) =
t∫
−∞
dt′K(t, t′)F (h[t′], v[t′]) (13)
with a kernel K(t, t′) decreasing as the analyzed point in the past, t′, goes away
from the current moment of time t.
Within a simple model of the driver memory characterized by the time scale T
the kernel of the integral operator (13) is approximated by the exponential function
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K(t, t′) = 1/T · exp[−(t− t′)/T ]. This enables us to rewrite (13) as
a(t) =
t∫
−∞
dt′
T
e−
(t−t′)
T F (h[t′], v[t′]) . (14)
or using the properties of the exponential function to represent (14) in the form
a(t) =
t∫
−t0
dt′
T
e−
(t−t′)
T F (h[t′], v[t′]) + e−
(t−t0)
T a0 , (15)
where
a0 =
t0∫
−∞
dt′
T
e−
(t0−t
′)
T F (h[t′], v[t′]) (16)
is the car acceleration taken at a certain time moment t0 < t chosen arbitrarily.
The integral equation (15) is equivalent to the following differential equation
da
dt
=
1
T
F (h, v)−
a
T
. (17)
subjected to the initial condition specified by expression (16)
a|t=t0 = a0 . (18)
Therefore for the exponential kernel of the integral Volterra equation (13) the de-
scription of memory effects in the car following is reduced to a certain differential
equation determined in the expanded phase space containing the car acceleration as
a phase variable. This differential equation can be subjected to the corresponding
initial condition at an arbitrary moment of time.
For the general form of the kernel K(t, t′) the conversion of the integral oper-
ator (13) into a differential equation subjected to some initial conditions becomes
impossible. In this case the notion of initial conditions is inapplicable. In systems
where human memory and perception play are crucial, it is the case, e.g., for traffic
flow, the kernel K(t, t′) seems to be a power function rather than the exponential
one. In fact, general speculations about the human memory and the event percep-
tion prompt us to make use of a scale-free-memory model to describe the effects of
the system history. To justify our point of view, let us consider two events character-
izing the system state in a similar manner, which enables us to compare them with
each other in assessing the current situation. If one of the two events happened one
day before the current date whereas the other happened one week ago, then we will
treat them as substantially different in time with respect to their contribution to
our perception of the present situation. By contrast, if the first event occurred one
month and one day ago and the second event occurred one month and one week ago
we will draw no real distinction between each other by the time of their occurrence
in evaluating their significance. In other words, if the time lag between the two
events is comparable with the time scale separating them from the present moment
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then their impacts will be regarded to be different in magnitude with respect to the
time of occurrence. On the contrary, if their time lag is much less then the passed
time these events can be considered to be simultaneous in evaluating their impacts.
Exactly such a behavior is common to power dependencies K(t− t′) ∝ (t− t′)−(1−γ)
with an the exponent 0 < γ < 1. The inequality γ > 0 has to hold because, oth-
erwise, functional (13) would be reduced to a local relationship without memory
effects.
This idea is partly justified by the observed long-time memory effects in the scale-
free foraging by primates [46, 47, 48] or insects [49, 50], and the conclusion about
the explicit relationship between scale-free foraging and the memory properties [51].
The human memory retrieval is also characterized by a scale-free pattern [52]. In
addition, as noted in Introduction, stock markets, where human factor definitely
matters, exhibit a long-time memory behavior of the type under consideration,
namely, time correlations in the volatility of returns are characterized by a power
decay (see, e.g, [20, 21]).
Nevertheless for such systems there is a certain approximation wherein the no-
tion of initial conditions can be introduced [53]. It is related to the assumption
that within a sufficiently long time interval of duration T in evaluating the ac-
tion preference the system elements remember the time moments of events when
they happened and their contribution to the perception of the current situation is
weighted by the the power type kernel K(t − t′). On temporal scales larger than
T the elements do not rank the events according to the time of their occurrence,
they just fix these events in the memory. In addition it is assumed that there is a
certain moment of time t0 at which the system dynamics was initiated, for exam-
ple, when the given group of cars entered the highway under consideration. All the
previous events happened before the system initiation are just aggregated without
ranking them according to the time of occurrence. In this case the integral Volterra
equation (13) is approximated as follows [53]
a(x, t) =
t∫
t0
dt′
Eγ,γ
[
−
(
t−t′
T
)γ]
τγ(t− t′)1−γ
F (h[t′], v[t′]) + Eγ
[
−
(
t− t0
T
)γ]
a0 . (19)
where τ is a certain microscopic time scale, a0 is the initial car acceleration chosen
by the driver at the initial time t0, and Eγ(. . .), Eγ,γ(. . .) are the Mittag-Leffler
functions [54]. Using the formalism of fractional calculus this integral equation is
be reduced to the following fractional differential equation [54]
CD̂γt0a(t) =
1
τγ
F (h[t], v[t])−
1
T γ
a(t) , (20)
where the left-hand side is the Caputo fractional derivative of order γ defined by
the expression
CD̂γt0a(t) :=
1
Γ(1− γ)
t∫
t0
dt′
(t− t′)γ
da(t′)
dt′
(21)
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and Γ(. . .) is the gamma function. Equation (20) should be subjected to the initial
condition (18).
In other words, for systems with motivation it could be possible to introduce, at
least, approximately the initial conditions at the moment of the system initiation
only. In addition, the fractional calculus is likely to be an appropriate formalism for
describing effects of the human memory.
5. Conclusion
The paper has considered systems with motivation as a typical example of sta-
tistical social systems. First, the elements of such a system are characterized by
motivated behavior and the decision-making process governs the system dynamics.
Second, all the elements can be divided into large groups by their properties and
similarity. Therefore the local self-averaging holds in these system, enabling us to
introduce the notion of the characteristic elements. Their regular properties describe
the common features of the elements, whereas the random ones take into account
the individuality of the elements as well as unpredictable factors of their behavior.
The purpose of the paper is to pose the question what physical notions and
mathematical formalism should be used or developed to describe the statistical so-
cial systems, or more strictly, the systems with motivation. In order to demonstrate
that the given question is not trivial up to know we have listed the basic properties
of social systems distinguishing them from physical ones or, more generally, natural
systems. Not intending to create a self-consistent and complete theory of such sys-
tems we have analyzed individually their characteristic features caused by the basic
properties of human beings and human societies. In particular, we have demon-
strated that modeling the description of these systems requires a extended phase
space comprising objective and subjective phase variables, the decision-making pro-
cess deals with the trajectories of the forthcoming system dynamics as the basic
units of description, the action points and dynamical traps are basic notions in
describing dynamics of elements with bounded rationality, and the system history
can play an essential role.
As the final conclusion we state that practically all the basic elements necessary
for describing statistical social systems or, more rigorously, systems with motivation
are available or partly developed in modern physics and applied mathematics.
The work was partially supported by RFBR Grants 06-01-04005 and 09-01-
00736.
References
[1] Castellano, C., Fortunato, S., and Loreto, V. Statistical physics of social dynamics,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 81 (2009) 591–646.
[2] Galam, S., Sociophysics: A review of Galam models, Int. J. Mod. Phys. 19 (2008)
409-440.
[3] Buchanan, M., The social atom (Bloomsbury, New York, 2007).
Mathematical formalism of physics of systems with motivation 23
[4] Chakrabarti, B. K., Chakraborti, A., and Chatterjee, A. (eds.) Econophysics and
Sociophysics: Trends and Perspectives, (Wiley VCH Verlag, Weinheim, 2006).
[5] Stauffer, D., Sociophysics Simulations, Computing in Science and Eng., 5 (2003) 71–
75.
[6] Helbing, D., Traffic and related self-driven many-particle systems, Rev. Mod. Phys.
73 (2001) 1067–1141.
[7] Couzin, I. D., Collective cognition in animal groups, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13
(2009) 36–43.
[8] Sumpter, D. J. T., Collective animal behavior (Princeton University Press, 2009)
(available online).
[9] Helbing, D., Quantitative Sociodynamics: Stochastic Methods and Models of Social
Interaction Processes (Kluwer Academic Publishes, Netherlands, 1995).
[10] Edling, C. R., Mathematics in Sociology, Annual Review of Sociology 28 (2002) 197–
220.
[11] Weidlich, W., Sociodynamics: A Systematic Approach to Mathematical Modelling in
the Social Sciences (Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 2002).
[12] Weidlich, W., Intentions and Principles of Sociodynamics, Evol. Inst. Econ. Rev. 2
(2006) 161-165.
[13] Haken, H., SynergeticsAn Introduction: Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self-
Organisation in Physics, Chemistry and Biology (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1977).
[14] Festinger, L., Schachter, S., and Back, K., Social Pressures in Informal Groups: A
Study of Human Factors in Housing (Harper, New York, NY, USA, 1950).
[15] Aoki, M. and Yoshikawa, H., Non-Self-Averaging in Macroeconomic Models: A Crit-
icism of Modern Micro-founded Macroeconomics, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 07-
E-057 (2007).
[16] Gallegati, M. and Kirman, A. P., Beyond the Representative Agent (Aldershot and
Lyme, NH, Edward Elgar, 1999).
[17] Hartley, J. E., The Representative Agent in Macroeconomics (London, New York:
Routledge, 1997).
[18] Durkheim, E., Pragmatism and Sociology (Cambridge University Press, 1983).
[19] Weber, M., The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Free Press, 1949).
[20] Wang, F., Yamasaki, K., Havlin, S., and Stanley, H.E., Scaling and memory of intra-
day volatility return intervals in stock markets, Phys. Rev. E 73 (2006) 026117(1-8).
[21] Yamasaki, K., Muchnik, L., Havlin, S., Bunde, A., and Stanley, H.E., Scaling and
memory in volatility return intervals in financial markets, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 102 (2005) 9424–9428.
[22] Beckert, J., What is sociological about economic sociology? Uncertainty and the
embeddedness of economic action. Theory and Society 25 (1996) 803-840.
[23] Hayakawa, H., Bounded rationality, social and cultural norms, and interdependence
via reference groups, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 43 (2000) 1–34.
[24] Savage, L. J., The foundation of statistics, 2nd edn. (Dover Publications, Inc, New
York, 1972).
[25] Simon, H. A., A behavioral model of rational choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics
69 (1955) 99–118.
[26] Simon, H. A., Theories of decision-making in economics and behavioral science, Amer-
ican Economic Review 49 (1959) 253–283.
[27] Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G., A behavioral theory of the firm, 2nd edn. (Prentice
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1992).
[28] Conlisk, J., Bounded rationality and market fluctuations, Journal of Economic Be-
havior and Organization 29 (1996) 233–250.
24 Ihor Lubashevsky and Natalia Plawinska
[29] Day, R. H. and Pingle, M., Economizing economizing, in Handbook of Behavioral
Economics, eds. Frantz, R., Singh, H., and Gerber, J. (JAI Press, Greenwich, CT,
1991), Vol. 2B, pp. 509–522.
[30] Rieskamp, J., The importance of learning when making inferences, Judgment and
Decision Making 3 (2008) 261–277.
[31] Rieskamp, J. and Otto, P. E., SSL: A theory of how people learn to select strategies,
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 135 (2006) 207–236.
[32] Miller, D. R., The study of social relationships: situations, identity and social inter-
action, in Psychology: A Study of a Science, ed. Kock S. (McGraw-Hill, New York,
1963) Vol. 5. pp. 639–737.
[33] Hayakawa, H. and Venieris, Y. P., Consumer interdependence via reference groups,
Journal of Political Economy 85 (1977) 599–615.
[34] Lubashevsky, I., Kalenkov, S., and Mahnke, R., Towards a variational principle for
motivated vehicle motion, Phys. Rev. E 65 (2002) 036140(1–5).
[35] Lubashevsky, I., Wagner, P., and Mahnke, R., Rational-driver approximation in car-
following theory, Phys. Rev. E 68 (2003) 056109(1–15).
[36] Lubashevsky, I., Wagner, P., and Mahnke, R., A bounded rational driver model, Eur.
Phys. J. B 32 (2003) 243–247.
[37] Wagner P. and Lubashevsky, I., Empirical basis for car-following theory development,
e-print: arXiv:cond-mat/0311192 (2003).
[38] Todosiev, E. P., The action point model of the driver-vehicle system, Techical Re-
port 202A-3, Ohio State University, August (1963) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State
University, 1963).
[39] Lubashevsky, I., Hajimahmoodzadeh, M., Katsnelson, A., and Wagner, P., Noised
induced phase transition in an oscillatory system with dynamical traps, Eur. Phys.
J. B 36 (2003) 115–118.
[40] Lubashevsky, I., Mahnke, R., Wagner, P., and Kalenkov, S., Long-lived states in
synchronized traffic flow: Empirical prompt and dynamical trap model, Phys. Rev. E
66 (2002) 016117(1–13).
[41] Lubashevsky, I. A., Mahnke, R., Hajimahmoodzadeh, M., and Katsnelson, A., Long-
lived states of oscillator chains with dynamical traps, Eur. Phys. J. B 44 (2005)
63–70.
[42] Zaslavsky, G. M., From Hamiltonian chaos to Maxwells Demon, Chaos 5 (1995) 653–
661.
[43] Zaslavsky G. M. and Edelman, M., Maxwells demon as a dynamical model, Phys.
Rev. E 56 (1997) 5310–5320.
[44] Zaslavsky, G. M., Dynamical traps, Physica D 168-169 (2002) 292–304.
[45] Lubashevsky, I. A., Gafiychuk V. V., and Demchuk, A. V., Anomalous relaxation
oscillations due to dynamical traps, Physica A 255 (1998) 406–414.
[46] Garber, P. A., The role of spatial memory in primate foraging patterns: Saguinus
mystax and Saguinus fuscicollis, Am. J. Primatol. 19 (1989) 203–216.
[47] Gibeault, S., MacDonald S. E., Spatial memory and foraging competition in captive
western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla). Primates 41 (2000) 147-160.
[48] Erhart, E. M. and Overdorff, D. J., Spatial Memory during Foraging in Prosimian
Primates: Propithecus edwardsi and Eulemur fulvus rufus, Folia Primatol. 79 (2008)
185–196.
[49] Johnson, R. A., Learning, Memory, and Foraging Efficiency in Two Species of Desert
Seed-Harvester Ants, Ecology 72 (1991) 1408–1419.
[50] Amaya-Ma´rquez, M., Hill, P. S. M., Barthell, J. F., Pham, L. L., Doty, D. R. and
Wells, H., Learning and Memory During Foraging of The Blue Orchard Bee, Osmia
Mathematical formalism of physics of systems with motivation 25
lignaria Say (Hymenoptera: Megachilidae), J. Kansas Entomol. Soc. 81 (2008) 315–
327.
[51] Koganezawa, M., Hara, H., Hayakawa, Y., and Shimada, I., Memory effects on scale-
free dynamics in foraging Drosophila, J. Theor Biol. 260 (2009) 353.
[52] Rhodes T., and Turvey, M. T., Human memory retrieval as Le´vy foraging, Physica
A 385 (2007) 255–260.
[53] Lubashevsky, I. and Kanemoto, S., Scale-free memory model for multiagent reinforce-
ment learning. Mean field approximation, arXiv:0911.2406 [physics.soc-ph] (2009).
[54] Kilbas, A. A., Srivastava, H. M., and Trujillo, J. J., Theory and Applications of
Fractional Differential Equations (Elsevier B.V., Amsterdam, 2006).
